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AGENCY IN AQUINAS 
Matthew J. KELLY 
A lthough St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's view that nothing divisible. i.e. no body, can move itself ("But the moving of the divisible itself, like its being. 
depends on its parts; it cannot therefore maye itself primarily and through 
itself").1 he does not hesitate to label animaIs "self-movers. "2 This suggests that 
the label, in this instance, is just a manner of speaking on his part and that he 
thinks that no animal is truly or really a self-mover. This suggestion seems con-
firmed, moreover, by those texts in which he both speaks of a living body as a 
self-moyer and refers to its body as its moved part and its soul as the part that 
moves, it moyer. For example: 
... every self-moyer is composed of two parts: one, the part that moves and 
is not moved; the other, the part that is moved. Now, the animal is a self-
mover, and the moyer in it is the soul, and the body is the moved. Therefore 
the soul is an unmoved moyer. But no body moves without being moved, 
... Therefore, the soul is not a body.3 
Since what moves itself must be moved by reason of itself and not by reason of a 
part of itself (" If something moves itself, ... it must be moved by reason of itself, 
and not by reason of a part of itself, ... "),4 living bodies, it seems, cannot truly 
be self-movers, for they are moved by a "part" of themselves, namely, their 
souls. 
Yet texts in which St. Thomas speaks of the soul of a living body as its moyer 
and of the body as the moved should not be taken as decisive in determining what 
St. Thomas had in mind in speaking ofliving bodies as "self-movers." Su ch texts, 
after ail, prove too much. ln the text just quoted, the soul appears to perform an 
operation in which the body does not share, for it is said to move the body without 
being moved. But this would mean, granted the Thomistic principle, "operatio 
sequi!lI" esse," used elsewhere to establish the subsistence of the human SOUl,5 
that ail souls, since they operate independently of their bodies, can exist indepen-
dently of their bodies, a conclusion St. Thomas would surely reject. St. Thomas 
J. CG. l, 13.7. 
2. Ibid. II. 65. 5. 
3. Idon. 
4. Ibid. l, 13. 5. 
5. ST. 1.75.2. 
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agrees that the soul of any animal would be a subsistent being should it be the 
moyer of its body and the following text seems a[so to indicate that in his mind 
neither the soul of an animal nor other of its parts can be its moyer: 
Sed illud quod non habet esse ni si per hoc quod est in altero, non potest 
remanere post illud, nec etiam potest esse motor, quamvis possit esse prin-
cipium motus, quia mOl'ens est ens pelfectum in se; ... 6 
Since consistency requires that we rule out the possibility that in calling 
animais "self-movers" St. Thomas meant to say they are moved by their parts, 
we are able on other grounds to exclu de the possibility that St. Thomas thinks of 
the living body as a machine and that ail the events occurring in it are produced by 
externally originated pullings and pushings. In St. Thomas' view such a body 
would not be alive: 
Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando incipit ex se motum habere; et 
tandiu iudicatur animal vivere, quandiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando 
vero iam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio, tunc 
dicitur animal mortuum per defectum vitae. 7 
In speaking of living bodies as "self-movers," St. Thomas must have meant 
that sorne of the events occurring in them are produced by (hem and not by any of 
their parts nor by external movers. This is, after ail, what "self-mover" means to 
him: 
If something moves itself, it must have within itself the principle of its own 
motion; otherwise, it is clearly moved by another. Furthermore, it must be 
primarily moved. This means that it must be moved by reaSO!l of itselJ; and 
!lot by reaSO!l of a part (~r itsdf', as happens when an animal is moved by the 
motion of its foot. 8 
Since something is an agent if the "moving" cause of sorne of the events occurring 
in it is neither a part internai to it nor a thing external to it but is itself, St. Thomas 
appears to have been thinking of living bodies as agents when he spoke of them as 
"self-movers. " 
We appear to have come full circle. How can St. Thomas be thinking of li ving 
bodies as agents when he speaks of them as "self-movers" and hold, as he does, 
that since "the moving of the divisible itself, like its being, depends on its parts, it 
cannot therefore move itself primarily and through itselj"?9 
Yet St. Thomas can hold. 1 think consistently, that the living body is an 
agent. Part of the answer to the problem we have raised lies, 1 suspect. in the 
ambiguities of the language St. Thomas found available for his philosophical and 
theological purposes. He recognized that the term "motion" had been used in the 
past to refer to very different processes. Plato had used it to speak of the "ac-
tivities" of perfect beings and spoke of God as a self-moved moyer, while Aristo-
6. /n/ Sent., d. R. q. 5. a. 2. arg. 5, quoted by J. Owens, "Soul as Agent in Aquinas," The IVew 
Scholasticism, XLVIII (Winter, 1974), pp. 40-72, p. 54, note 22. Italies mine. 
7. ST. l, 18, 1. 
8. CG. 1. 13, 5. lLalics mine. 
9. CG. J, 13, 7. lLalies mine. 
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tle tended to use it as a technical term to refer to what is going on in an imperfect 
being when it is being perfected in sorne way: 
It is to be noted, however, that Plato, who held that every moyer is moved, 
understood the name 'motion' in a wider sense than did Aristotle, For Aristo-
tle understood 'motion' strictly, according as it is the act of what exists in 
potency inasmuch as it is such. So understood, motion belongs only to divisi-
ble bodies, as it is proved in the Physics. According to Plato, however, that 
which moves itself is not a body. Plato understood by 'motion' any given 
operation, 50 that to understand and to judge are a kind of motion. Aristotle 
likewise touches upon this manner of speaking in the De Anima. Plato accord-
ingly sa id that the first moyer moves himself because he knows himself and 
wills or loves himself. In a way, this is not opposed to the reasons of Alisto-
tle. There is no d(fJerence between reaching afirst being that moves himself: 
as understood by Plato, and reaching a first being that is absolutely UIl-
mm'ed, as understood by Aristotle. 10 
In Aquinas' philosophical tradition, "motion" can refer to the processes going on 
in a perfect being and the processes going on in a being not yet perfect when it is 
being perfected. U sed in this latter way, a term with a passive sense, rather than 
active, better captures its meaning. In this sense, it is better to say of something 
"moving" that it is "being moved," or, more concretely, "burned," "dried," 
"pulled," "pushed," or whatever. Clearly, St. Thomas is understanding "mo-
tion" in this way wh en he argues that everything moved is moved by another ll 
and when he accepts Aristotle's view that nothing divisible, i.e. no body, can 
move itself. 
In thinking of living bodies as "moving" things. as things in "motion," as 
"self-movers," St. Thomas need not be using "motion" in Aristotle's narrow and 
technical sense. lndeed, he, himself, tells us that what he has in mind is compati-
ble with the wider non-technical sense: 
... it is clear that those things are properly living which move themselves 
according to sorne species of motion; whether 'motion' is taken properly as 
when the act of the imperfect, thal is, the aet (~f something existing in po-
teney, is called 'motion'; or 'motion' is taken commonly, as when the act (~f 
the perfeet is called 'motion,' inasmuch as to understand and to sense is said 
to be 'motion,' ... 12 
In viewing living bodies as self-movers, in thinking that they, themselves, and 
neither their parts nor things external to them, are the "moving" cause of sorne of 
the processes occurring in them. St. Thomas is thinking of living bodies as agents 
and of the processes occurring in them as actions. Since living acts are something 
living things do rather than something they su ft'e r , his view that they are self-
movers is in conflict with neither the principle, "Whatever is moved is moved by 
another," nor the position that "the divisible ... cannot therefore move itself 
primarily and through itself." These latter principles are in conflict with "self-
motion" only if "motion" always means being moved. Indeed, the phrase "self-
10. CG. I, 13, 10. Italics mine. 
\1. CG. \, 13.4-10. 
12. ST. I, 18, 1. Italics mine. 
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motion," if "motion" means being moved, is like the phrase "square circle," for 
if something should be moved primarily and through itself. it cou Id not in this 
instance be its own moyer, i.e. be moving itself primarily and per se. Since 
St. Thomas has in mind agents acting when he labels animais "self-movers," he 
can, in this sense of the phrase, label ail living things "self-movers," whether 
God, angels, men, animaIs, or plants. 
St. Thomas, moreover, seems to extend the concept of agency to things other 
than living substances. He always opposed, for example, Avicebron's teaching 
that something within bodies, rather than they, themselves, is the "moving" 
cause of ail the events occurring in them. This would mean, as St. Thomas sees it, 
that bodies are in motion in the sense only that they are being moved. But, for 
St. Thomas, to be "moving" only in the sense of "being moved," to be only 
moved and never a moyer, is characteristic of prime matter only and of no thing: 
It must be known, however, that when Avicebron argues: there is something 
'moving but not moved,' namely the first maker of things; 'therefore con-
versely there is something which is moved and a patient only,' that is to be 
conceded. But this is prime matter, which is pure potency, as God is pure act. 
A body, however, is eomposedfi"om poteney and aet; and is, therefore, both 
an agent and a patient. 13 
For Aquinas, the universe of substances is a uruverse of agents; it is a universe of 
"self-movers," and as he sees it, at least one of the processes occurring in each 
and every thing has as its moving cause the thing itself and neither its parts nor 
external things. 
In "moving itself' in at least one way, each thing performs an action. While 
St. Thomas will speak of two kinds of actions, distinguishing them along the lines 
of the distinction between transitive and intransitive action,14 it is his view that the 
latter kind of action is the sort of action which must be present in each thing, for 
the former presupposes the latter-there can only be a "moving" in the sense of a 
moved ifthere first is a "moving" in the sense of a "self-motion."15 
St. Thomas, obviously, did not find this thesis ofuniversal agency incompat-
ible with the view that God is a universal moving cause and the heavens a moving 
cause somewhat less universal, 16 for, even though God and/or the heavens should 
cause ail things to do what they do, the fact remains that things are doing what 
they do. God and/or the heavens would have to cause whatever occurs in any 
thing to Interfere with their agency and to be incompatible with the thesis of 
universal agency: If C should be the only thing going on in B. Bis an agent even if 
A causes B to do C. On the other hand, B is not an agent if A causes C. 17 
St. Thomas faces, however, two problems: one is generated for him by the 
thesis of universal agency and the other by that thesis plus his view that there is a 
13. ST. l, 115. 1 ad 2, Italics mine. 
14. CG.II,I,2. 
15. Ihid., Il, l, 3. 
16. In fact, he finds the thesis that there is a universal moving cause and that human agents act freely 
compatible. 
17. ST. l, 105,4 and 2: "Et sic moveri ex se non repugnat ei quod movetur ab alio." 
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universal moyer. First of ail, he faces the task of explaining how, granted ail things 
are agents, i.e. self-movers, the self-movers that are living bodies differ from 
self-movers that are not alive, and, secondly, he must explain how, granted there 
is a universal mover, human agents sometimes have the power. which most other 
bodies lack, of doing or not doing something. How can it be up to them. in sorne 
instances at least, to walk or not to walk if it be the case that they are always 
caused to do what they do? If what we have determined so far is correct, 
St. Thomas cannot make the difference between living and non-living bodies lie in 
this that ail the events going on in the latter are caused by things external to them 
and not by them-if that be true they are not agents. nor does it suffice to explain 
human freedom-though this may be the best anyone can do-to note that agency 
is compatible with a universal moving cause and that we deliberate because we 
think it is within our power sometimes to do one or the other of at least two things. 
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